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Abstract
Background: In case of orphan drugs applicability of the standard health technology assessment (HTA) process is
limited due to scarcity of good clinical and health economic evidence. Financing these premium priced drugs is
more controversial in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region where the public funding resources are more
restricted, and health economic justification should be an even more important aspect of policy decisions than in
higher income European countries.
Objectives: To explore and summarize the recent scientific evidence on value drivers related to the health technology
assessment of ODs with a special focus on the perspective of third party payers in CEE countries. The review aims to
list all potentially relevant value drivers in the reimbursement process of orphan drugs.
Methods: A systematic literature review was performed; PubMed and Scopus databases were systematically searched
for relevant publications until April 2015. Extracted data were summarized along key HTA elements.
Results: From the 2664 identified publications, 87 contained relevant information on the evaluation criteria of orphan
drugs, but only 5 had direct information from the CEE region. The presentation of good clinical evidence seems to play
a key role especially since this should be the basis of cost-effectiveness analyses, which have more importance in
resource-constrained economies. Due to external price referencing of pharmaceuticals, the relative budget impact of
orphan drugs is expected to be higher in CEE than in Western European (WE) countries unless accessibility of patients
remains more limited in poorer European regions. Equity principles based on disease prevalence and non-availability of
alternative treatment options may increase the price premium, however, societies must have some control on prices
and a rationale based on multiple criteria in reimbursement decisions.
Conclusions: The evaluation of orphan medicines should include multiple criteria to appropriately measure the clinical
added value of orphan drugs. The search found only a small number of studies coming from CEE, therefore European
policies on orphan drugs may be based largely on experiences in WE countries. More research should be done in the
future in CEE because financing high-priced orphan drugs involves a greater burden for these countries.
Keywords: Rare disease, Orphan drug, Economic evaluation, Technology assessment, Cost effectiveness, Drug
approval, Central and Eastern Europe
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Background
According to the definition of the European Medicines
Agency orphan drugs (ODs) are intended for diagnosis,
prevention or treatment of rare diseases (RDs), whose
conditions affect no more than 5 in 10,000 persons, are
life-threatening or chronically debilitating and have no
satisfactory method of diagnosis, prevention or treat-
ment [1]. The number of orphan drugs designated by
the European Committee of Orphan Medicinal Products
(COMP) is expected to grow at an average of 10 % per
annum between 2011 and 2020. It seems that the success
rate for approvals per orphan designation is also averaged
at 10 % [2]. The total number of orphan medicines with
marketing authorization is growing year by year [3–5].
The Orphan Drug Act in the United States [6] and the
Orphan Drugs Regulation in Europe [7] (also the legisla-
tion in Japan and Australia) seem to be a great success.
These legislations have generated incentives for the pri-
vate sector to develop innovative drugs for rare and ser-
ious diseases that have had no treatment yet. In some
respects, the regulations tried to handle a supply side
market failure [8]. Simultaneously, the regulations raised
several new dilemmas; one of the most problematic is-
sues being how to apply health technology assessment
(HTA) for ODs to support the evidence base of pricing
and reimbursement decisions. Owing to the high cost of
these medicines and the limitations in clinical evidence,
the standard methodology and decision criteria of HTA
seem to be difficult to use regarding most of the ODs.
Consequently, there is an intensive debate in the scien-
tific literature and also among policymakers and other
stakeholders in the everyday practice on how to increase
the evidence base of policy decisions without providing
disincentives for R&D in rare diseases. There is a need
for an adequate, transparent evaluation process to judge
the clinical added value of ODs and to provide a consist-
ent decision support tool for policymakers [9].
Financing high-priced orphan drugs is even more con-
troversial in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) re-
gion. These middle income countries face even greater
challenges in the reimbursement decisions of the ODs, as
their financial resources are significantly lower compared
to the Western European (WE) countries.
The objective of this systematic literature search was
to explore and summarize the recent scientific know-
ledge about the evaluation and reimbursement of or-
phan medicines. The research placed special attention
on the CEE perspective. There was a special emphasis
on the key elements of HTA, including efficacy, effect-
iveness, cost-effectiveness, budget impact and equity.
Additional data was collected about different value
drivers in the identified evaluation frameworks. The
transferability of the general results to the CEE region
will be discussed.
Methods
A systematic literature search was performed in PubMed
and Scopus internet databases to explore recent evidence
on value drivers related to the health technology assess-
ment of ODs with a special focus on the perspective of
third party payers in CEE countries. The systematic litera-
ture review was conducted and reported in compliance
with the PRISMA statement [10]. Every relevant record
was considered between January 2000 and April 2015. The
search terms included rare disease* or orphan and re-
imburse*, evaluation, effective*, assess*, HTA, threshold,
decision, policy or evidence. Title-Abstract screening
was performed with predefined exclusion criteria (see
Additional file 1). Special attention was given to papers
published in the CEE region. Data extraction occurred
in concordance with the main components of HTA, in-
formation on efficacy, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness,
budget impact and equity were collected in Excel sheets.
The goal of this review was to present a comprehen-
sive overview on any potential value drivers described in
the scientific literature, therefore no limitations were ap-
plied in terms of the quality of evidence presented by
the studies. Editorials, letters, as well as systematic re-
views were also included. The type of the articles was
registered in every case (see Additional file 2).
Descriptive summaries will be presented in the qualita-
tive synthesis; the nature of gathered information does
not allow for a quantitative meta-analysis to be carried
out. A further limitation is that the materials presented
by authorities, legislative bodies or HTA/technology ap-
praisal committees were not reviewed.
Results
All together 2664 items were identified in the two data-
bases from which 1985 records were left after duplicates
were removed. Four additional articles were included
based on a Google search and after reviewing reference
lists in other relevant articles. During the Title/Abstract
screening, 1867 records were excluded. The flow of in-
formation can be seen on Fig. 1.
After performing a Title/Abstract screening, 122 articles
remained for full text screening, which were read and
assessed by two reviewers. In the end, 87 full text papers
were included in the analysis (see Additional file 2), among
which only 5 publications addressed directly the research
question from the perspective of CEE countries [11–15].
Efficacy, effectiveness
The systematic search found 42 studies that addressed ef-
ficacy and effectiveness of ODs from an HTA perspective.
In case of orphan medicines, several factors hamper the
measurement of the drug’s clinical added value and it
seemed difficult to evaluate the drug’s efficacy in the ma-
jority of the cases. Figure 2 summarizes the key reasons.
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Many of these characteristics had been acknowl-
edged previously and registration authorities realized
that along the lines of conventional requirements, mar-
ket access for ODs would be almost impossible, there-
fore they softened the registration criteria [16]. As a
consequence, the evidence base of ODs in HTA evalu-
ations is often premature, while these drugs receive
marketing authorisation earlier in the development
phase [17, 18].
Nevertheless, the picture is nuanced: some papers
pointed out that in a significant percentage of rare dis-
eases, well-designed clinical trials (e.g., RCTs) would be
feasible [19, 20]. It is also possible to modify traditional
RCTs designs (sequential, three-stage or adaptive de-
signs) in order to gain more power from a small patient
population [21, 22]. Authors emphasized the importance
of surrogate endpoints if clinical data are incomplete.
These measures can only be accepted and valued in the
assessment process if their relation to clinical efficacy is
well-described with its uncertainty too [23–25]. At the
same time, it seems difficult to validate surrogate markers
without a long-term follow up [26].
Despite these facts, the evidence on efficacy should be
one of the most important if not the most important
value driving component of the technology assessment
process [24, 27, 28]. In a recent systematic review, the
authors concluded that “ODs [should] have to prove
effectiveness like any other drug” [29]. These claims
are confirmed by the empirical results of two workshops
(experts and patients), which weighted the factor ‘Evidence
of treatment clinical efficacy and patient clinical outcomes’
with the highest value [30].
A viable option is to declare transparently that more
priority is being given to ODs and greater flexibility is
being applied for the assessment of forms and/or quan-
tity of available data. A basic remark to this option is
Fig. 1 Flow of systematic literature review
Fig. 2 Factors that hinder the efficacy measurement of ODs [19, 23, 24, 29, 31, 34–36, 45, 46, 52, 55, 59, 60, 89–92]
Zelei et al. Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases  (2016) 11:72 Page 3 of 11
that in cases of rare diseases, which are serious or life-
threatening, patients are willing to accept a higher level
of risk if no other treatments are available [31, 32]. In
such cases policymakers may also be willing to accept
lower statistical significance of clinical benefits [33].
In case of non-curative OD treatments, the stable or
progression-delayed patient status can be a therapeutic
benefit. However, the curative and non-curative orphan
treatments should be differentiated in medical, ethical
and economical aspects [25].
Continuous research after positive reimbursement
decisions can be a commitment for the manufacturer
(with conditional reimbursement, through observational
studies, registries) to generate new evidence with the
long-term follow up of patients [34, 35]. Several authors
pointed out the usefulness of ongoing evaluations
through national and Europe-wide registries of data out-
come [24, 36–41].
In summary, the misleading presumptions should be
eliminated, the ODs are not a homogenous group,
and the feasibility of providing high-quality evidence
should be addressed on a case by case basis [42, 43].
Lower standards can only be accepted if substantial
efforts failed to gather enough patients in randomized
trials [44]. This is the responsibility of registration
authorities.
In case of papers referring to the CEE perspective, limited
information was available, but the results were similar.
Iskrov et al. emphasized in their two papers (2012, 2013)
that the absence of clinical data is a common problem for
all countries, and especially huge challenge for Bulgaria
[11, 12]. The importance of long-term effectiveness
measurements was one of the main conclusions of
Logviss et al. (2014) also, who analysed the orphan
drug situation in Latvia [13].
Budget impact
The systematic search found 25 studies that addressed
the budget impact (BI) of ODs from an HTA perspec-
tive. In the majority of countries, BI analysis of ODs is
included in the technology assessment process, even
though in early years it was not considered a decisive
factor due to the low disease prevalence [34]. The rela-
tively small BI facilitated the market access in certain
cases [33]. However, due to the escalating drug prices,
policymakers started to recognize the growing import-
ance of BI, especially after more and more ODs entered
the market. The cumulative expenditure on ODs
reached the stimulus threshold of third party payers, and
they even expect further increases in the budgets of ODs
[2, 12, 29, 32, 33, 41, 45–49]. Based on a projection of
Hutchings et al. (2014), BI of ODs in Sweden and France
are going to increase slightly until 2020, but it could re-
main sustainable [50].
Small impact itself cannot be a decisive factor in re-
imbursement decisions anymore. Usually, opportunity
costs of funding rare diseases are not known and
therefore cannot be considered comparable with the
benefits. As McCabe et al. (2007) stated, the conclu-
sion cannot be made that many small cuts on the
budget have no or little impact on overall health or
less impact than a single large cut of comparable
costs [43]. Instead of the reimbursement of an expen-
sive orphan medication with relatively a small budget
impact, it is also a question why not spend the same
budget amount on the treatment of a subpopulation
in a more frequent disease with a larger cumulative
health gain in cases where a medication was rejected
earlier because of its high budget impact [28]. The increa-
sing expenditure of ODs challenges the boundaries of the
solidarity principle in public healthcare systems because
less and less resources are available for treatments of more
common diseases [32, 46].
A significant percentage of the overall budget impact
is concentrated on only very few drugs. Based on the
French data, the first five ‘blockbuster’ ODs account for
50 % of the French OD budget [51]. Overall cost expos-
ure is related to the disease prevalence, the number of
indications, the potential for off-label use and the avail-
ability of less expensive treatment options. Several authors
emphasized that only a detailed budget impact analysis,
which includes calculations of the factors mentioned
above, would facilitate responsible planning and enable
decision makers to develop a sustainable budget for a rare
disease portfolio [24, 25, 31, 52, 53]. Ideally, in case of add-
itional indications, the whole budget impact should also
be reported [54]. In cases of previously mentioned block-
buster drugs, presumably not all of these elements were
carefully considered or the successive reimbursement
dossiers of the same orphan drug were not handled in
relation to each other [27, 55].
In CEE countries there is stronger restriction of
public resources for financing pharmaceuticals. The
relatively small market size of CEE countries contrib-
utes to their weak negotiating power to influence the
price level of ODs, hence prices of these drugs are
not among the lowest in Europe as is usually the case
with ‘common drugs’. Consequently, the affordability
of ODs is more limited in CEE, which reduces the ac-
cessibility of patients with rare diseases to ODs [11,
13, 15]. CEE authors pointed out that often there are
shortcomings in budget impact analyses, hence the
impact should be assessed more accurately [12, 13].
According to Iskrov et al. (2013), in contrast to ‘com-
mon drugs’ the legislation in Bulgaria does not clearly
define what type of costs should be calculated in
budget impact analyses of ODs [12]. In Latvia, the
costs related to rare diseases and ODs are currently
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included in the national healthcare budget, but there are
special rules for drugs with a high annual cost, hence the
budget for ODs has not been determined explicitly [13].
Cost-effectiveness
The systematic search found 48 studies that addressed
the cost-effectiveness of ODs from an HTA perspective.
There is an intensive debate in the literature over how
to apply and interpret the cost-effectiveness criteria in
the assessment of ODs. The current practice varies
across different countries; there are examples where the
presentation of a pharmacoeconomic analysis in the re-
imbursement dossier is not necessary (e.g., Turkey, The
Netherlands), in contrast to most other European coun-
tries where it is compulsory to perform such an analysis
[13, 33, 56–58]. In the past decade, funding for these drugs
was rejected more often due to unmet cost-effectiveness
criteria [28]. This position was not unified and the issues
led to the formulation of a number of questions.
The first problem is the scarcity of good clinical evi-
dence about the effectiveness of ODs, which makes a
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) difficult. According to
some authors, it seems almost impossible to perform a
conventional CEA [12, 24, 59]. Even if such an analysis
is feasible, only a few ODs get close to meeting the
standard cost-effectiveness criterion due to the high in-
cremental costs compared to moderate health gains pro-
vided by the drug [45, 46, 48, 60–63]. Cost-ineffective,
ultra-orphan drugs have been approved by appraisal com-
mittees in several countries, which means that present
economic criteria are not sufficient for the evaluation of
these drugs, since the true societal value of the provided
benefits cannot be measured [42, 43, 64, 65].
Cost-effectiveness thresholds are the symbol of the
most highly accepted opportunity cost, in order to deter-
mine whether a treatment should be financed publicly
or not. Where decisions regarding ODs are systematic-
ally made against these norms, these criteria should be
revised [66]. If orphan medicines with significantly
higher ICERs are routinely reimbursed, then the health
gain of rare disease patients are also valued significantly
higher. In order to maintain transparency, this prefer-
ence for severe, rare conditions, which have no other
treatment should be explicitly declared [42, 44].
McCabe and colleagues raised an important question:
where we insist on applying standard methods to ODs
and there is an expectation (as several authors empha-
sized) that an OD will not receive reimbursement based
on pure cost-effectiveness, then a valid question to be
asked is why we have incentives to develop them at all.
Considering this point, these incentives (previously used
resources) are simply sunk costs if the drug is not cost-
effective [43, 47]. The most important signal and incen-
tive to the market is the price paid for a drug or the
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio used in the evalu-
ation. These values should not be driven by previously
provided incentives. If the threshold is transparent, both
the evaluation committee and the market know how
much money is worth spending on them. The key chal-
lenge is the identification of the existence and magnitude
of “the orphan premium” [43]. If this can be measured
and used transparently, cost-effectiveness threshold
could be determined.
One basis of exempting ODs from the standard cri-
teria, if a societal preference could be revealed for priori-
tizing rarity [61, 63]. A frequently cited study from the
NICE Citizen’s Council reported weak evidence about
positive social valuation of rarity [67]. Few experimental
studies, which investigated this issue, emphasized the
choice avoidance and the preference instability of re-
spondents [61, 68–70]. Although experimental research
could not confirm any social value, disease rarity alone
seems to increase the tolerance of uncertainties by deci-
sion makers [44].
In Latvia, there is no specific reimbursement regulation
for ODs, but cost-effectiveness analyses are obligatory,
therefore the reimbursement decision is value based. Also
in Serbia, the assessment committee take the cost-
effectiveness of the drug into account [13, 14]. The cost-
effectiveness of ODs is not considered in Bulgaria, but the
price of ODs should be based on the lowest reference
price from a basket of European countries [11].
The literature search found several recommendations
in connection with the questions described above. Au-
thors stated that if at least moderate clinical evidence is
available, a standard cost-effectiveness analysis can be
performed. Certain ODs can be cost-effective along a
standard threshold [43, 71]. However, there can be huge
uncertainty concerning the estimates that can hinder re-
imbursement until more evidence becomes available
[63]. Policymakers may ignore cost-effectiveness evi-
dence, but in this case, the product must provide the
minimal requirements of additional health benefits and
at least reliable estimates of budget impact [47, 53]. In
opposition to such an approach, several authors sug-
gested an intermediate solution, namely that the stand-
ard methodologies of cost-effectiveness analysis for ODs
are appropriate, but need to be fine-tuned and updated
[29]. Table 1 summarizes the proposed solutions.
No matter how we overrate the health gain of rare
disease patients, we contradict the ethical principle for
evaluation of people’s lives and health equally [32, 63, 72]
(see details in section Equity).
In the CEE region, the question is even more contra-
dictory. The prices are moving in a relatively narrow
range across Europe mainly due to external reference
pricing, but the cost-effectiveness thresholds in different
countries are rather in connection with the gross
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domestic product (GDP) that differs significantly among
the European member states [73]. In several CEE coun-
tries, there is an explicit threshold for cost-effectiveness
related to the GDP per capita (see Hungary, Poland) or
the mandatory base monthly salary (see Slovakia), how-
ever rarity and severity of the disease have no impact on
the explicit threshold. As there are no specific thresholds
for ODs, these medicines are even more rarely cost-
effective in CEE [74]. However, a well-defined HTA
process with mandatory cost-effectiveness analysis still
improves the transparency of policy decisions related to
ODs [11].
Equity
Equity aspects of the reimbursement of ODs are princi-
pal, due to the unique position of rare disease patients.
All together 37 papers dealt with equity principles and
several viewpoints surfaced in the intensive debate sur-
rounding these issues.
The basic moral dilemma is that if we have an ex-
tremely high cost - but effective - OD, we will pay for it,
despite scarce resources and the possibility of spending
the same money on ‘common’ disease patients, where
the cumulated health gain would be significantly greater.
To put it in question form, should we value the health
gain of rare disease patients more highly or in other
words should we accept the higher ICERs of ODs?
The utilitarian viewpoint would say ‘No’. According to
utilitarians, we have to produce as much good (health)
as possible within our fixed limits. Investing substantial
amounts of resources for the treatment of rare condi-
tions may be considered unethical from this perspective,
because the society’s benefits (and health gain) are not
maximized [19, 34, 75]. Additionally, if we pay for or-
phan medicines with high ICERs, we overrate the health
gain of rare disease patients while undervaluing the
health gain of common disease patients. This rationale
cannot be justified ethically [34]. As the number of reim-
bursed ODs is growing, even more ‘common’ patients
with equal capacity to benefit will be withdrawn from
treatments [66]. As long as there is no scientific
evidence about societal preference for treating rare and
serious disorders, the more frequent serious diseases
should be treated where the cumulative health gain is
larger [43, 63].
The utilitarian standpoint must be the basis of re-
source allocation in general, but if we ask, “Is it fair that
people are judged only in terms of how cost-effective their
health gain is?”, and the answer is ‘No’ [76], what can be
the basis for giving rare disease patients a chance and
for paying the premium price of their drugs? Table 2
summarizes literature findings, including the ethical
principles cited as a basis for funding orphan medicines,
and as it is seen, these are not mutually exclusive. The
third column of Table 2 summarizes the main criticisms
against each principle.
According to general criticism against ethical princi-
ples, there is a propensity to give greater weight to help-
ing identified victims rather than statistical victims.
Identified victim bias should be eliminated in case of
valuing health gains of rare disease patients [77].
The debate about the position of rare disease patients
can be translated into vertical and horizontal equity
questions, where those representing ethical consider-
ations generally argue in favor of reasons for vertical
equity, while their critics argue in favor of horizontal
equity [38].
Summary of value drivers
The evaluation of orphan medicines should include mul-
tiple criteria to appropriately measure the value of these
drugs. Paulden et al. (2015) in their systematic review
identified several value-bearing factors for ODs [29]. We
explored the relevance of these factors from the view-
point of third party payers in CEE countries, and added
other value drivers we identified in the systematic litera-
ture review. CEE countries may not necessarily apply all
value drivers presented in Table 3, however, this list can
be an appropriate basis for the multicriteria evaluation
framework for the reimbursement process of ODs. If
these criteria are applied in an explicit multicriteria deci-
sion analysis (MCDA) tool, selection, scoring and
Table 1 Proposed solution to handle higher ICERs of ODs
Proposed Solution Description References
Weighted QALY “Weighted QALYs (according to disease prevalence, severity) attach a higher
value to the health gain of a person with a rare disease. Therefore the ICER will decrease,
increasing the likelihood of meeting the (standard) threshold.”
[32, 34–36, 62, 75, 76, 93, 94]
QALY categorization Prioritization of rare disease groups could be achieved by categorizing QALY’s based
on e.g., disease states
[75]
Higher CE-threshold for ODs Accepting a higher cost-effectiveness threshold for ODs increases the probability
that these drugs will be cost-effective
[36, 92–94]
Special rules above the CE-threshold • Above the cost-effectiveness threshold special support funds or specific political
decisions may be needed.
• Assess the profitability of ODs on different price levels (cost is warranted and based
on a careful consideration of the manufacturer’s cost and returns on investment.)
[95] [47]
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weighting of the criteria may provide a tailored approach
for each individual CEE countries. Kolasa et al. (2016) in
their MCDA tool developed for the Polish reimburse-
ment process of orphan drugs included ten of these cri-
teria [78].
Discussion
Our systematic search found few studies referring to
CEE countries, despite the fact that reimbursement of
ODs is becoming increasingly important for public
payers in European regions with more economic con-
straints [79]. Since international evidence on value
drivers of ODs is often generated in higher income
countries (e.g., Western Europe), the transferability of
these research findings to lower income countries has to
be considered carefully.
The information on relative effectiveness is considered
transferable between higher and lower income countries
[80]. Therefore, if the problem is solved by global regula-
tors and policymakers, there is no additional action item
from the viewpoint of CEE countries. However, in this
region there is even more limited information on the
number and distribution of rare disease patients, there-
fore it is difficult to predict baseline risks and disease
progression. In general, the health status of population is
lower in CEE compared to WE, so potentially the same
relative risk reduction may result in even greater abso-
lute risk reduction and health gain [18]. In addition, ad-
herence and persistence of patients in CEE is even worse
than in WE, thus it is difficult to judge how efficacy
measured in clinical trials may translate to effectiveness
in the real world [81]. Nevertheless, the main objective
Table 3 Potential value drivers of ODs in CEE countries
Disease-related factors Treatment-related factors Economic factors Societal factors
• Prevalence (rarity) of disease
• Severity of disease
• Identifiability of the patients of treatment
• Loss of QALYs without treatment
• Unmet medical need
(i.e., availability of treatment alternatives)
• Clinical heterogeneity of the disease
(i.e., subgroup of patients)
• Evidence of treatment efficacy or effectiveness
• Capacity to benefit from the treatment
(i.e., magnitude of benefit)
• Treatment is curative or delays progression
or alleviates symptoms (e.g., palliative care)
• Safety profile of treatment






• Potential for off-
label use
• Societal impact of treatment
(i.e., indirect costs on families
and caregivers)
• Equity in access to treatment
• Legal considerations (i.e., patent
status)






• Society should not abandon individuals who are suffering
from a serious and rare condition [19, 96].
• Reimbursement of ODs promotes the appearance of social
solidarity where vulnerable groups are supported [35].
• Social justice requires treating everybody with dignity
and respect as a human being [97].
• Public healthcare should guarantee the best supportive care
for everyone. Restrictions made only for drugs that are far from
being cost-effective [8, 44].
“Rule of
rescue”
• Society puts greater value on health gains of individuals
who are in immediate peril, and there are a small number
of cases where no alternative treatments are available [34].
• Identifiable individuals are an essential part of this
principle [98].
• Lifesaving ability should be considered in the reimbursement
decision, but more specifically, only for therapies of life-
threatening diseases, which have no alternative treatments.
In this later case, the drugs should be financed irrespectively
of their cost [28, 31, 96].
• Immediate, life-threatening peril also characterized several other
diseases, for which treatment can be more cost-effective [19, 90].
• Since every person faces imminent death in certain periods of time,
this cannot be a differentiating characteristic of rare diseases [8].
• It is not right to select one orphan drug over another as having
particular social value, because it is not equal to value lifesaving
drugs more than cosmetic drugs [26].
• “Rule of rescue” cannot be feasible at population level in an
era of constrained resources [90].
“Rights based
approach”
• Social solidarity requires that all members of the society have
access to a decent minimum standard of healthcare because it
is the right and fair thing to do [92, 97].
• Right of access to high-quality health care is embedded in the
legislation of the developed countries [36, 75, 96].
• “Right-based approach” would not necessarily favour the treatment
of rare conditions over more prevalent conditions, because these
patients also receive the same standard of care [34].
“Equality of
opportunity”
• Every member of the society should have the same
opportunities to receive treatment and this must be true for
rare disease patients as well as other patients with more
frequently occurring disorders [60, 96].
• Everybody should have a fair chance to receive not only
some treatment, but also the best available treatment [47].
• The equality of opportunity should be the paramount
consideration in determining social value [65].
• Effectiveness of ODs is not sufficiently proven in several cases
(See section Efficacy, effectiveness)
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of third-party payers is to buy health gain. If there is sig-
nificant uncertainty related to the clinical added value of
an OD, it does not make sense to grant reimbursement
based on equity to access without considering the efficacy
criterion. If initial efficacy results of an OD are very prom-
ising in a Phase 2 study, societies may ensure rapid regis-
tration, but until the evidence is sufficiently confirmed,
the manufacturer has to accept risk-sharing arrangements
(e.g., coverage with evidence development) with payers to
manage uncertainties related to health outcomes.
Economic principles should be the driver for the alloca-
tion of scarce resources [75]. Cost-effectiveness evidence
of ODs stems from two different sources, therefore
decision should be made on how to manage uncertain
estimates of costs and effects [43]. Transferability of
cost-effectiveness evidence is highly limited from one
country to another, especially if there is a significant
difference between the socioeconomic status of the coun-
tries. Therefore, the relevance of cost-effectiveness evi-
dence generated in WE is highly limited in CEE, thus local
adaptation of international economic models are neces-
sary to draw conclusions on the value of any technologies,
including ODs [18].
Presumably, our sense of equity and solidarity form
the basis of our willingness to pay a premium price for
these drugs. Both equity principles and their counter ar-
guments can be seen as true when examined separately,
but if there is an effective and curative drug for a ser-
ious, life-threatening disease, everything must be done
to finance the price that is placed on the clinical added
value of the medicine. There is a tradition to accept
equity principles in post-communist CEE countries. The
question is how this tradition can be translated to rare
diseases, especially in difficult economic periods.
There is an international aspect of equity related to
the accessibility of patients to ODs in higher vs. lower
income European countries. Within the European
Union, there should not be differences between member
states in the accessibility of patients with rare diseases to
medicines. However, in CEE the public health budgets
are particularly limited and vulnerable [11]. Unfortunately,
external price referencing may prevent manufacturers of
ODs from launching their products at significantly lower
prices in lower income European countries [82]. Conse-
quently, the deviation of OD prices is relatively small
across Europe, but their affordability is very different
across the regions. Systematic research of orphan drug
utilization across European countries is rare, however
existing information indicates that there are significant
differences between WE and CEE countries. O'Mahony
et al. (2013) found differences in the availability of treat-
ment and care of hemophilia patients across Europe [83].
Pavlovic et al. (2012) identified inequities in access to ODs
between Serbia, Bulgaria and Sweden [14]. Also, Picavet
et al. (2012) observed a substantial difference in market
uptake of ODs between European countries. They con-
cluded that such variation should have an effect on access
to care and should produce a significant inequality of
treatment [15]. Logviss et al. (2014) also raised attention
to the availability problem of orphan medicines in Latvia.
Moreover, those drugs that were available, were often not
accessible because of the insufficient reimbursement [13].
Availability and affordability are equally important compo-
nents of inequities in patient access in EU countries ac-
cording to EURORDIS [84]. Due to their limited access,
the cumulative budget impact of ODs can be similar in
CEE and WE, but if CEE countries intend to grant the
same access for their patients, the relative impact within
the whole budget should be significantly higher. The
transferability of budget impact analysis from one country
to another is highly limited. If the budget impact of an or-
phan drug is relatively low in a WE country due to a small
patient population, the drug is still not necessarily afford-
able in CEE.
Equity aspects can justify some price premium, but the
magnitude should be acceptable from a societal perspec-
tive. And here is a difficult question to raise: is it accept-
able that lower income countries have to pay the same
high price for ODs on the basis of equity as their wealth-
ier counterparts? Probably not. The value-based price of
a new technology is country-specific, usually less in
lower income countries and larger in higher income
countries, since the willingness to pay for one unit of
health gain is different. If European policymakers pro-
vide incentives for R&D of ODs to reduce the inequity
between patients of common vs. rare diseases, they
should develop plans to transfer these benefits to pa-
tients in CEE countries. Otherwise, mainly WE patients
may enjoy the positive results of EU policies regarding
rare diseases. Joint European procurement of ODs might
reduce the price of these medicines, and payment ac-
cording the “ability to pay” by each EU member state
can potentially reduce the unequal patient access. How-
ever, this solution requires the revision of current EU
framework related to external price referencing and par-
allel trade practices.
Conclusion
Pricing and reimbursement of ODs should be more
transparent and evidence based in the CEE region. Man-
ufacturers should take the budget constraints and the
lower ability into account to reimburse these high priced
drugs. Policy tools have to be developed to alleviate
negative consequences on external pharmaceutical price
referencing systems in relation to the accessibility of pa-
tients to ODs. Until external price referencing exists and
is strengthened even compared to current European prac-
tices, manufacturers will not be motivated to implement
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differential pricing to guarantee faster access of patients in
countries with less market potential. The relatively small
market potential partially explains why our search found a
very small number of studies coming from the CEE re-
gion. It is highly unfortunate that policy research is less
prevalent in those countries where access to these drugs is
more limited. More policy research in CEE is needed in
order to take the needs and constraints of these countries
into account when developing a European policy frame-
work for ODs.
Current joint policy initiatives by supranational bodies
and scientific organizations are promising. The CAVOMP
(Clinical Added Value of Orphan Medicinal Products)
[85], the IRDiRC (International Rare Diseases Research
Consortium), the MoCA (Mechanism of Coordinated
Access to Orphan Medicinal Products) Working Group
[86], the Rare Diseases Special Interest Group of ISPOR
[87] or more broadly the EUnetHTA [88] may provide
better evaluation framework for ODs in the near future,
which hopefully takes into account the necessities of
lower income economies as well.
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